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FAIR USE OF UNPUBLISHED WORKS: AN INTERIM REPORT
AND A MODEST PROPOSAL
In 1939, an American court called the fair use doctrine "the most
troublesome in the whole law of copyright."' One still hears such com-
plaints,' even though Congress codified the doctrine when it revised the
federal copyright statute in 1976.' In codifying the fair use doctrine,
Congress did not intend to change it. Anticipating "a period of rapid
technological change," and convinced that courts could best handle its
impact on fair use, Congress left the fair use doctrine in the judiciary's
1. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam). The courts
first developed the doctrine to justify uses of printed material that copyright statutes might otherwise
have forbidden. English courts developed the fair use doctrine in the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, in cases decided under Great Britain's copyright statute. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE
FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 6-17 (1985). See also infra note 33 and accompanying
text (citing the British statute). American courts followed suit in cases decided under federal copy-
right statutes. See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. Sitting as circuit judge in the District
of Massachusetts, Justice Story introduced the fair use doctrine into American law between 1839
and 1841, first as dictum in Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5,728), then
as a rule of decision in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). See
PATRY, supra, at 18-19. In Folsom, Justice Story enumerated the factors that courts should consider
in fair use determinations:
In short, we must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the nature and objects of
the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which
the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the
original work.
Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348, quoted in PATRY, supra, at 20. See also PATRY, supra, at 24-25 (analyzing
Justice Story's application of his factors).
2. The titles of two recent law review articles so attest. See Jay Dratler, Jr., Distilling the
Witches' Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 233 (1988); William W. Fisher
III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659 (1988).
3. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). The relevant provision, § 107 of the copy-
right statute, provides that:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means
specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringe-
ment of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case
is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Id.
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hands.4 There the doctrine remains as troublesome as ever.5
As Congress expected, technological change has posed new fair use
issues for the courts.6 However, the most controversial fair use question
to arise since 1976 concerns traditional activities: may journalists, biog-
raphers, and historians quote or paraphrase unpublished sources? To-
day, courts increasingly are likely to say no.
In Harper & Row, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,7 the Supreme Court held
that the scope of fair use is narrower for unpublished works than for
published works.8 Building on Harper & Row, the Second Circuit, in
Salinger v. Random House, Inc. ,9 held that unpublished works "normally
enjoy complete protection against copying."' Finally, in New Era Publi-
cations International v. Henry Holt & Co.," another Second Circuit
panel stated that the fair use doctrine bars virtually all use of unpub-
lished sources.2
4. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5680. The House Report explained that:
Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria
applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a
case-by-case basis. Section 107 is intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair
use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.
Id.
5. One author finds the doctrine incoherent because its theoretical bases conflict. See Fisher,
supra note 2, at 1693. The author identifies four competing rationales for copyright protection and
the fair use privilege: 1) to serve the public welfare by generating and disseminating original works;
2) to ensure contributors the rewards of their intellectual labor; 3) to protect the "personal rights" of
artists and writers over their work; and 4) to adhere to and reinforce popular conceptions of decent
behavior. Id. at 1686-91. These objectives may produce divergent results when applied as rules of
decision. Id. at 1691. Fisher, therefore, concludes that "the normative foundation of the [fair use]
doctrine is fragmented," id. at 1693, and proposes both utilitarian and utopian analyses based on
economic and cultural productivity. Id. at 1695-98.
For efforts to clarify the theory of fair use on market and property grounds, see Wendy J. Gordon,
An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement
Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1989); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982)
[hereinafter Fair Use as Market Failure]. On the theory of copyright and its application to fair use
analysis, see infra Part III.
6. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), the first fair use
case to reach the Supreme Court after passage of the 1976 act, concerned home videotaping of
television broadcasts.
7. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
8. Id. at 564.
9. 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
10. Id. at 97.
11. 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1168 (1990).
12. Id. at 583. "Where use is made of materials of an unpublished nature," no court has ever
found "in favor of an infringer, and we do not do so here." Id.
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Although New Era's fair use analysis is only dictum,13 it alarms its
critics because it suggests that "all copying from unpublished work is per
se infringement." 4 These critics include several Second Circuit judges, 5
and also members of Congress who seek to amend the federal copyright
law to ensure that the fair use privilege applies to unpublished as well as
13. The Second Circuit's chief judge pointed this out in a sharply critical concurrence. Id. at
585 (Oakes, C.J., concurring). Even New Era's author admits that its fair use analysis is "nondis-
positive." New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 884 F.2d 659, 660 (2d Cir. 1989) (Miner,
J , concurring in denial of petition for rehearing), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1168 (1990). New Era's
fair use discussion is dictum because the court resolved the case on other grounds. 873 F.2d at 577,
584-85 (denying injunction of allegedly infringing work on ground of plaintiff's laches).
14. 873 F.2d at 593 (Oakes, C.J., concurring) (criticizing the court's fair use analysis). Mem-
bers of literary circles have complained about New Era's "chilling effect" on research, writing, and
publishing. R.Z. Sheppard, Foul Weather for Fair Use: A Wave of Copyright Suits Puts Scholars on
the Defensive, TIME, Apr. 30, 1990, at 86. See also Leon Friedman, Copyright Wrongs: Fair Use
Cases, THE NATION, Mar. 19, 1990, at 368. Such complaints are especially urgent because the
publishing industry is concentrated in New York City, which is within the Second Circuit's jurisdic-
tion. A recent newspaper report is indicative of the Salinger and New Era cases' effect on publish-
irg. According to the report, editors and publishing house lawyers now widely assume that, under
the Salinger-New Era standard, quoting more that 50 words from an unpublished source amounts to
copyright infringement. Roger Cohen, Software Issue Kills Liberal Amendment to Copyright Laws,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1990, § 1, at 1 (quoting Leon Friedman).
Some observers fear that Salinger-New Era will frustrate the writing of contemporary history.
See, e.g., David A. Kaplan, The End of History?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 25, 1989, at 80. The article
quotes historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. as noting: "If the law were this way when I wrote the three
volumes of The Age of Roosevelt, I might still be two volumes short." Id.
The legal difficulties that the Salinger-New Era doctrine creates for biographers are already appar-
ent. Biographers of Saul Bellow, Richard Wright, Malcolm X, William Faulkner, and James Agee
all face legal challenges to their work. Sheppard, supra; Bob Sipchen, Who is the Owner of the
Written Word? Recent Court Rulings Make It Harder for Biographers to Quote From a Subject's
Writings. The Problem: Copyright Infringement, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1990, View, at El. Saul
Bellow, for example, has delayed the appearance of a biography whose author, Ruth Miller, quotes
extensively from his letters to her. Because Bellow threatened legal action, the publisher recalled
reviewers' galleys for rewriting. See John Blades, Stop the Presses: Bellow's Clout Delays Biography,
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 18, 1990, Tempo, at Cl; David Streitfeld, Not on His Life, WASH. POST, Apr. 15,
1990, Book World, at X15.
Legal questions and not just the notoriety of the writers involved, novelist J.D. Salinger and L.
Ron Hubbard, explain much of the nationwide press coverage of Salinger and New Era. For com-
mentary on Salinger, see, e.g., David Margolick, Whose Words Are They Anyway?, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 1, 1987, § 7 (Book Review), at 44; Ted Solotaroff, The Literary-Industrial Complex: How the
Corporate Mentality Has Undermined the Profession of Publishing, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 8,
1987, at 28; David Streitfeld, Appeal Rejected in Salinger Case, THE WASH. POST, May 5, 1987, at
D4. For a discussion of New Era, see, e.g., M.R. Montgomery, High Court Stays Out of Copyright
Fight, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 21, 1990. at 41; Chaos: Fair Use Provisions of the Copyright Law and
Unauthorized Biographies, THE NATION, June 5, 1989, at 759; Robert D. McFadden, Court Chal-
lenges Scholars' Right to Quote from Private Documents, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1989, at Al.
15. See infra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
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to published works.16
According to its critics, the judiciary's emerging per se rule against the
fair use of unpublished sources threatens contemporary history, biogra-
phy, and journalism. 17 If Congress fails to ensure the fair use of unpub-
lished works, can and should courts do so? Part I of this Note argues
that existing law does not preclude fair use of unpublished works. Part
II establishes that courts are more likely to ensure that the fair use privi-
lege applies to unpublished text than is Congress. Part III surveys the
debates about copyright policy to which Harper & Row, Salinger, and
New Era gave rise, identifies three policies of copyright law, and, in light
of those policies, suggests how courts may revise existing doctrine to al-
low a finding that an historian, biographer, or journalist has made fair
use of unpublished text. 8
I. FAIR USE OF UNPUBLISHED SOURCES: THE STATE OF THE LAW
4. The Significance of Congress' Revision of Federal Copyright Law in
1976
Section 107 of the Copyright Statute is part of a sweeping revision of
federal copyright law Congress undertook in 1976.19 To assess that legis-
lation's impact on the protection of unpublished works, one must begin
with state common law copyright, which, in 1976, still afforded unpub-
lished works virtually complete protection against copying.2" Under
state common law copyright, authors had an absolute right of first publi-
16. See Robert L. Koenig, Simon's Copyright Bill Would Allow "Fair Use", ST. Louis PoST-
DISPATCH, May 11, 1991, at C9. Senator Simon's bill revives earlier legislation that Senator Orrin
Hatch of Utah killed in committee. See infra notes 140-53 and accompanying text.
17. For example, Senator Simon described his first proposal to amend § 107 of the federal copy-
right statute as "a bill important to scholarly research and the preservation of history" because it
would restore the Act's "balance," upset by the Second Circuit, between "the interests of accurate
scholarship or journalism" and "the right[s] of authors to control the publication of their own un-
published work." 136 CONG. Rac. S3549 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1990).
18. Focusing strictly on fair use questions, this Note does not address the First Amendment
issue Harper & Row raises: whether the protection of political speech exempts public political
figures' works from copyright protection. For detailed discussions of the First Amendment concerns
in Harper & Row, see, e.g., Floyd Abrams, First Amendment and Copyright: The Seventeenth Don-
ald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1 (1987); W. Warren Hamel, Harper &
Row v. The Nation: A First Amendment Privilege for News Reporting of Copyrightable Material?, 19
COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PRoBs. 253 (1985); Greg A. Perry, Note, Copyright and the First Amendment:
Nurturing the Seeds for Harvest, 65-NEB. L. REV. 631 (1986).
19. Pub. L. No. 94-553, Title I, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976). See also PATRY, supra note 1, at
213-319 (for legislative history from 1958-1976).
20. PATRY, supra note 1, at 123.
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cation. The law protected that right by forbidding the copying of most
unpublished works.2' Only unpublished works that already had been
publicly disseminated (as a manuscript might be) or performed (as a the-
atrical work might be) could be quoted.22 Thus, common law copyright
undeniably allowed some copying. But that narrow privilege must not be
confused with the fair use privilege, which courts developed in cases con-
cerning the infringement of statutory copyright, and which (like statu-
tory copyright before 1976) only applied to printed works.2"
According to one authority, Congress did not intend its revision of
statutory copyright to disturb common law copyright's rigorous protec-
tion of unpublished works.2 4 Supporting that argument is the congres-
sional testimony of experts who, from the beginning of congressional
efforts to revise federal copyright law, advised Congress that common
law precluded the fair use of unpublished works.25 In addition, when
Congress finally enacted the 1976 copyright legislation, the accompany-
ing House Report declared that Congress intended section 107, the sec-
tion that codified the fair use doctrine, to "restate the present judicial
21. Id.
22. See id. Under state common law, courts "uniformly held that fair use could not be made of
unpublished and undisseminated works." Id. See also id. at 439-41 (on state common law
generally).
23. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the early history of the fair use
doctrine).
24. PATRY, supra note 1, at 441 ("A review of the legislative history of the 1976 Act reveals
that Congress intended to continue the common law prohibition against fair use of unpublished but
not voluntarily disseminated works." See also id. at 444 n.442. However, Patry recently has re-
jected this opinion. Accordingly, he:
confesses that he has already undertaken a reexamination of a number of his positions and
found them wanting. For example, he has confesses [sic] to mechanically reciting the ad-
age "there is no fair use of unpublished works," thereby failing to adequately take into
account the different types of unpublished works and uses thereof...
Editor's Note, 36 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y [page preceding 167] n.3 (1989).
25. PATRY, supra note 1, at 441 n.431. For example, Abraham Kaminstein, then Register of
Copyrights, reported to Congress in 1961 that "[u]npublished works under common law protection
are also immune from the limitations on the scope of statutory protection that have been imposed in
the public interest. These limitations ... include the fair use doctrine." REPORT OF THE REGISTER
OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 40, quoted in PATRY,
supra note 1, at 441. At hearings on Kaminstein's report, commentators modified his formula so
that it conformed entirely to the state common law scheme. Such a scheme allowed copying from
unpublished works that already had been disseminated or performed. The example given was the
publicly performed play from which theater critics might quote without risk of a copyright infringe-
ment suit. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 2. DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 27, quoted in PATRY, supra note 1, at 442.
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doctrine of fair use, not... change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way. '' 26
Because the fair use privilege applied only to published works in 1976,27
one may reasonably conclude that Congress did not wish to expose un-
published works to fair use.2"
Yet Congress did just that in 1976. Despite the House Report's lan-
guage, Congress knew it was exposing unpublished works to fair use.29
In reports issued in 1966 and 1967, the House Judiciary Committee de-
clared: "The applicability of the fair use doctrine to unpublished works
is narrowly limited. . ". ." A limitation on the fair use of unpublished
works would be absurd if the privilege did not exist. The "narrowly lim-
ited applicability" language reappears unchanged in the Senate Report
for 1975,31 and is incorporated by reference in the House Report for
1976,32 which accompanied the copyright revision legislation when Con-
gress finally enacted it. Thus, congressional reports suggest that Con-
gress did extend the fair use privilege, though in narrowly limited form,
to unpublished works.
The legislation itself supports such a conclusion. Earlier copyright
statutes, beginning with the Statute of Anne enacted in 1710, applied
only to published works.33 Under powers that the Federal Constitution
26. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5680.
27. See supra notes 1, 23, 26 and accompanying text.
28. See PATRY, supra note 1, at 441. See also supra note 26.
29. H.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1966); H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 37 (1967), quoted in PATRY, supra note 1, at 443. According to both reports,
The applicability of the fair use doctrine to unpublished works is narrowly limited since,
although the work is unavailable, this is the result of a deliberate choice on the part of the
copyright owner. Under ordinary circumstances the copyright owner's "right of first pub-
lication" would outweigh any needs of reproduction for classroom purposes.
Id. (emphasis added). The House Reports' language addresses educational photocopying alone. Ed.
ucational photocopying was much on the minds of legislators engaged in revising the copyright law,
and was the subject of conferences before they drafted the 1976 act and the reports accompanying it.
See PATRY, supra note 1, at 296-304 (the authoritative history of the conferences), However, the
same House Reports elsewhere expand the application of the language quoted above by explaining
that "[t]he concentrated attention given the fair use provision in the context of classroom teaching
activities should not obscure its application on other areas." H.R. REP. No. 2237, supra, at 64; H.R.
REP. No. 83, supra, at 35. This language is repeated textually in H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 26,
at 5686.
30. See supra note 29.
31. S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 64 (1975).
32. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 26, at 5680 (noting that the discussion of educational
copying in the House Report of 1967, which the Senate Report of 1975 had adopted, "still has value
as an analysis of various aspects of the problem").
33. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1710, 8 Anne ch. 19 (Eng.).
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vests in it,34 Congress has passed similar laws since 1790. 3" None of
these laws extended statutory copyright protection to unpublished works.
In 1976, however, Congress enlarged statutory copyright protection to
include any "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium
of expression." 36 Having thereby brought unpublished works under fed-
eral copyright law, Congress expressly provided that federal law should
preempt equivalent "legal or equitable rights" for protectable works
-whether published or unpublished."'3 7
By expanding the scope of statutory copyright protection to unpub-
lished works, however, Congress exposed them to fair use.38 Congress
granted the "owner of copyright" "exclusive rights" in protected works,
but "[s]ubject to section[ ] 107," subject, that is, to the fair use privilege
codified in section 107.39
In enacting section 107, Congress intended neither to change nor to
immobilize fair use doctrine.' But section 107 did change fair use doc-
trine by enumerating four factors that courts "shall" consider when en-
gaging in fair use analysis: 1) "the purpose and character of the use"; 2)
"the nature of the copyrighted work"; 3) "the amount and substantiality
of the portion used"; and 4) "the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work."41 These four mandatory
factors are "nonexclusive, ' ' 42 so courts may add others to the list. Since
34. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress power to "promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries").
35. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 26, at 5660 (providing an overview of copyright legislation
since the enactment of Article I, § 8).
36. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1991).
37. Section 301(a) provides that "all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 ... whether pub-
lished or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title." 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1988).
38, See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A],
n.28.1 at 13-88.7 (1991) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].
39. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). The House Report accompanying the Act
explains that the rights § 106 confers include "the rights of copying, recording, adaptation, and
publishing." H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 26, at 5674. By including the "right[ ] of. . . publish-
ing" among the protected rights, Congress again indicated its intention to expand the coverage of
statutory copyright protection to include unpublished works.
40. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
41. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(l)-(4) (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). In its introductory language, § 107
also suggests that copying for "purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (in-
cluding multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copy-
right." Id.
42. Harper & Row, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) ("Section 107 requires a
1991] 1237
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section 107 lists these factors without explaining them, one judge has
complained that the factors are "opaque" and "uninformative." 43 None-
theless, section 107's four mandatory fair use factors have governed judi-
cial fair use analysis since the provision's enactment. 4
4
More important, the Supreme Court in Harper & Row and the Second
Circuit in Salinger applied section 107's four factors in cases concerning
unpublished works.45 The courts rejected the fair use defenses advanced
in those cases. 46 However, they did entertain the defenses, thus confirm-
ing that the policy of the copyright law of 1976 is to apply statutory
copyright protection and the fair use privilege to unpublished as well as
to published works.47
Thus, Congress "revolutionized the U.S. copyright system" when it
revised federal copyright law in 1976 and enacted section 107.48 But, if
the 1976 legislation did indeed abolish an ancien rdgime in copyright,
case-by-case determination whether a particular use is fair, and the statute notes four nonexclusive
factors to be considered.").
43. Pierre N. Leval, Fair Use or Foul? The Nineteenth Donald C Brace Memorial Lecture, 36
J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 167 (1989). Judge Leval observed:
Our statute and our judge-made law talk around the subject [of fair use]. They mention
factors, but give no standard. And those factors are stated in an opaque and uninformative
way. We are told for example to look at the purpose and character of the secondary use
and at the nature of the copyrighted work. "What about them?," you may ask. We are not
told. We are told to look at the amount of the taking and the effect on the market. "How
much is too much?" We are not told.
Id. The authors of a leading treatise on copyright law agree with Judge Leval:
mhe four factors of Section 107 purport merely to aid analysis of whether a given use is
"fair," not to offer a comprehensive framework from which that answer may be mechani-
cally determined. It is open to question, however, whether even that modest goal is
achieved by the amorphous language of the statute.
3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 38, § 13.05[A][5], at 13-88.13. See also id. at 13-88.17,
44. See, eg., infra notes 63-67, 71-89 and accompanying text.
45. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560-69; Salinger, 811 F.2d at 96-99.
46. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 569; Salinger, 811 F.2d at 99.
47. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560-69; Salinger, 811 F.2d at 96-99.
48. Barbara Ringer, statement at The Joint Hearings on S. 2370 and H.R. 4263 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice ofthe House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (July 11, 1990) (statement available from the House Subcomm.
on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice). According to Ringer, the for-
mer Register of Copyrights, Congress "revolutionized the U.S. copyright system" in enacting § 107
"by bringing all unpublished works under the statute and, with some exceptions, doing away with all
common law rights in copyrightable subject matter." Id. Accord John M. Kernochan, Protection of
Unpublished Works in the United States Before and After The Nation Case, 33 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
322, 326 (1986); Jon 0. Newman, Copyright Law and the Protection of Privacy, 12 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 459 (1988) ("With the advent of the 1976 Copyright Revision Act, the erosion of the
historic protection provided by the common law copyright accelerated.").
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what circumstances now should lead a court to extend or deny the fair
use privilege to a given use or user of unpublished works? Courts have
barely begun to answer that question.
B. Judicial Doctrine Since 1976
The fact-specific nature of fair use questions does not readily allow
courts to make broad rules.49 Only two cases currently furnish rules and
holdings relevant to the fair use of unpublished works: the Supreme
Court's decision in Harper & Row, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises 10 and the
Second Circuit's decision in Salinger v. Random House, Inc. 1 These de-
cisions confirm that, in 1976, Congress exposed unpublished works to the
fair use privilege.5 2 They also suggest some of the factors that might
limit that privilege when the work copied is not yet published.13
1. Harper & Row, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises
In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court held that The Nation magazine
infringed copyright when the magazine printed the most important
passages from Gerald Ford's autobiography before that book's publica-
tion. 4 To reach that conclusion, the Court engaged in a two-part fair
use analysis built on common law copyright and on section 107's four
factors.
The Court's analysis began with common law copyright." According
49. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 26, at 5679 (fair use is "an equitable rule of reason"
under which "each case raising the [fair use] question must be decided on its own facts").
50, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
5 1 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
52. See infra notes 59, 79-89 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
54. 471 U.S. at 569. The passages in question concerned Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon. The
Court considered them to be the "heart" of Ford's book. Id. at 564-65.
55. The Court properly used common law principles. See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying
text. However, the Court's decision to begin its fair use analysis with common law principles may be
questioned. The Court claimed statutory authority for its common law argument: "The statutory
formulation of the defense of fair use in the Copyright Act reflects the intent of Congress to codify
the common law doctrine." 471 U.S. at 549 (citation omitted). But here the Court may have con-
fused common law copyright with fair use doctrine, which is a judicial doctrine qualifying statutory
copyright protection of printed works. See supra notes 1, 23, 25 and accompanying text.
The Court also relied on legislative history, which stated that Congress, in enacting § 107, "in-
tended to restate the [pre-existing] judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in
any way." 471 U.S. at 549 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 26, at 5680). If Congress did
not intend to enlarge the fair use privilege, the Court may have reasoned, then common law princi-
ples still governed copying from unpublished sources. But if it so reasoned, the Court ignored an
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to the Court, common law gave authors an absolute right to property in
their unpublished work,56 but tempered that absolute rule by allowing
fair use of works already disseminated or performed.57
The Court's analysis continued on statutory grounds. Shifted to those
grounds, Harper & Row presented a very different question to the Court.
The Nation argued that under the revised copyright law of 1976, the fair
use privilege applies in like manner to published and unpublished texts.58
The Supreme Court observed that, although Congress brought unpub-
lished works within the protection of statutory law and thus exposed
them to fair use, Congress did not drain the distinction between pub-
lished and unpublished works of all legal significance for fair use
analysis. 59
Accordingly, the Court in Harper & Row labored to introduce that
distinction into fair use doctrine, so that unpublished works might enjoy
a level of protection recalling, though not replicating, the absolute pro-
tection common law afforded. According to the Court, "the unpublished
nature of the [copied] work figure[s] prominently in fair use analysis."'
Indeed, the Court found the work's unpublished nature to be an impor-
tant factor that weakened a defense of fair use.61 Recalling the language
of common law copyright, the Court concluded that normally the au-
thor's interest in determining the manner of the initial appearance of his
or her undisseminated work outweighs a claim of fair use.62
Having introduced common law copyright concerns into the fair use
doctrine, the Harper & Row Court finally considered section 107's four
fair use factors.63 The Nation's having quoted material from Ford's
memoirs that he had not yet published informed more than one factor of
the Court's fair use analysis. Convinced that market effect is the most
important fair use consideration," the Court sought to disallow uses
which in purpose or effect might preempt an unpublished work's future
important fact: Congress preempted common law copyright protection for unpublished works in
1976. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
56. 471 U.S. at 551 (quoting American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 299
(1907)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 552 (paraphrasing The Nation's argument).
59. Id. at 553-54.
60. Id. at 553.
61. Id. at 554.
62. Id. at 555.
63. Id. at 560-69. See supra note 1.
64. 471 U.S. at 566.
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market.6 However, the Court also sought to secure for authors of un-
published works the confidentiality and creative control they might re-
quire and held that "[t]he fact that a work is unpublished is a critical
element of its nature."66 The Court conceded that individuals may take
"even substantial quotations" from published or disseminated works, but
it insisted that "the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpub-
lished works."67
2. Salinger v. Random House, Inc.
J.D. Salinger gave the Second Circuit its first chance, after the
Supreme Court's Harper & Row decision, to decide a fair use case involv-
ing quotations from unpublished sources. In Salinger v. Random House,
Inc. ,6s the reclusive author of The Catcher in the Rye sued to enjoin the
publication of a biography that paraphrased and quoted extensively from
his unpublished letters, letters that their recipients had deposited at uni-
versity libraries where Salinger's biographer consulted them.69 The case
65. With respect to purpose (the first fair use factor), the Harper & Row Court found that The
Nation attempted to take advantage of the publicity surrounding its unauthorized first publication of
a public figure's work. Exploitation of an infringement, the Court held, could not excuse the in-
fringement. Id. at 561. The Court followed its holding in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1983), and found that a commercial use of copyrighted material
raises a presumption that the use is unfair because it is commercially harmful. 471 U.S. at 562.
Weighing market effect (the fourth fair use factor), the Court again found that an infringed work's
unpublished status could tilt the balance of equities against fair use. Applying a material impairment
test under which "[flair use ... is limited to copying by others which does not materially impair the
marketability of the work which is copied," id. at 566-67 (quoting 1 NiMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra
note 38, § 1.10[D], at 1-87), the Court noted that "extensive prepublication quotations from an
unreleased manuscript ... poses substantial potential for damage to the marketability of first serial-
ization rights." Id. at 569. But cf. Fisher, supra note 2, at 1673-74 (rejecting the material impair-
ment test as too broad, since any uncompensated use of a copyrighted work deprives the copyright
owner of a use fee and thereby materially impairs the owner's market). See also infra note 173 and
accompanying text (on the likelihood of double-counting market effect in fair use analysis under
§ 107).
66. 471 U.S. at 564 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1982)).
67. Id.
68. 811 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
69. Id. at 92-94. Before gaining access to those documents, Salinger's biographer, Ian Hamil-
ton, signed agreements with the libraries, limiting the uses he could make of the letters without
permission from the libraries and the owners of the literary property rights. Id. at 93. With
Princeton University, for example, he agreed "not to copy, reproduce, circulate or publish" the
manuscripts without permission. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), rev'd, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987). See also id. at 427 (for the
agreements with libraries at Harvard University and the University of Texas).
Despite these restrictions, Hamilton quoted at length from the letters. Salinger, who had obtained
galley proofs of the biography, instructed his counsel to object to the biography's publication until
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reached the Second Circuit on appeal from the Southern District of New
York, which had found for the biographer on fair use grounds.70 The
Second Circuit rejected almost all of the lower court's fair use
conclusions.
After underscoring the traditional doctrine's exclusion of unpublished
works from fair use, the Second Circuit embarked on section 107's four-
factor inquiry.71 With respect to the "purpose or character of the use,"7 2
the Second Circuit found that scholarly purposes might permit a biogra-
pher to quote from a subject's unpublished letters.73 Because copyright
law protects only expression, the Second Circuit held that biographers
may quote to substantiate facts,74 but should be enjoined if they make
more than brief quotations of unpublished expressive content. 75 The
court found that Salinger's biographer almost had exceeded that limit.76
It concluded that while the purpose factor favored the biographer, it did
not justify his receiving any exceptional consideration.77
While discussing the first statutory factor, the court assigned only
passing significance to the unpublished status of Salinger's letters.78 But
in discussing the "nature of the copyrighted work," 79 the court followed
Harper & Row and held that an infringed work's unpublished status is
"critical." 80 However, the court found "some ambiguity" in "the
Supreme Court's observation that the scope of fair use is narrower with
respect to unpublished works."8" That observation, the Salinger court
explained, could mean either that less text may be quoted, or that courts
are less likely to approve any quotation at all.82 Admitting that there
Hamilton deleted all quotations from the letters. 811 F.2d at 93. In response, Hamilton revised the
book. However, even after revision it still closely paraphrased Salinger's language and took some
200 words from the letters. Id. Upon reviewing proofs of the revised version, Salinger sued to
enjoin publication. Id. at 94.
70. 650 F. Supp. at 426.
71. 811 F.2d at 95-99. See supra note 1.
72. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(1) (West 1977 & Supp. 1991).
73. 811 F.2d at 96.
74. Id. ("The biographer who copies only facts incurs no risk of an injunction; he has not taken
copyrighted material.").
75. 811 F.2d at 96.
76. Id. at 97.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 96.
79. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(2) (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). See supra note 3.
80. 811 F.2d at 97 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564).
81. Id. (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564).
82. Id.
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was some support for the first reading, 3 the Salinger court nevertheless
chose the second. "[U]npublished works," the court held, "normally en-
joy complete protection against copying.' 4 Having thus read Harper &
Row, the Salinger court found that the second fair use factor weighed
against Salinger's biographer.85
The Second Circuit considered the significance of an infringed work's
unpublished status for a third and final time when weighing the fourth
statutory fair use factor: the "effect of the [infringing] use upon the po-
tential market for or value of the copyrighted work."8 6 Quoting Harper
& Row, the court called this factor "the single most important element of
fair use" because substantial quotation from an unpublished work could
damage its marketability. 7 Finding that Salinger's biographer had taken
quotations of such magnitude from Salinger's letters,"" the court con-
cluded that "some impairment of the market seems likely.""9
3. Harper & Row and Salinger: Their Lessons and Their Limits
The lessons of Harper & Row flow largely from its resolution of the
tension between common law copyright and statutory copyright law as
revised by Congress in 1976. Common law grants unpublished works
83. Id. According to the court, "[s]ome support ... can be derived from the statement in
Harper & Row that, though substantial quotations might be used in a review of a published work,
the author's right to control first publication weighs against such use prior to publication." Id.
(quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(4) (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). See supra note 3. The unpublished status
of Salinger's letters was irrelevant to the court's analysis of the third statutory fair use factor, the
"amount and substantiality of the portion used." 811 F.2d at 97. According to the Second Circuit,
even a "cliche" or "ordinary" word or phrase deserves protection when found in a "passage" that
"as a whole displays a sufficient degree of creativity." Id. (citing Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall
St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95-96 (2d Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978); Nutt v.
National Inst. Inc. for the Improvement of Memory, 31 F.2d 236, 237 (2d Cir. 1929)). Applying its
high standard to the quotations and paraphrases from Salinger's letters, the Second Circuit con-
cluded that they "exceed[ed] that necessary to disseminate the facts." Id. at 98 (quoting Harper &
Row, 471 U.S. at 564). Finding that Salinger's biographer had made "a very substantial appropria-
tion" of Salinger's prose, the Second Circuit concluded that "the third fair use factor weighs heavily
in Salinger's favor." Id. at 98-99.
87. 811 F.2d at 99 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566).
88. Id. According to Judge Newman, Hamilton took "virtually all of the most interesting
passages of [Salinger's] letters, including several highly expressive insights about writing and literary
criticism." Id.
89. Id. The court nonetheless concluded that the book's publication would not harm the let-
ters' marketability. However, the court held that the final factor slightly favored Salinger. Id.
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absolute protection,' while statutory law, in principle, allows at least
some fair use of such works. 9 1
Under common law copyright, Harper & Row would have been an
easy case. The publishers of Gerald Ford's memoirs were keeping them
secret to maintain the commercial value of their serialization in Time
Magazine.92 Indeed, to copy from the book, The Nation used a "pur-
loined manuscript." '93 As an unpublished and undisseminated work,
therefore, the book fell under the absolute common law rule against
copying. By applying that rule, the Court easily could have found The
Nation liable for copyright infringement. Instead, by applying section
107's four-factor fair use analysis to a case alleging copyright infringe-
ment of an unpublished and undisseminated work, the Court, in effect,
acknowledged that in revising copyright law in 1976, Congress changed
common law copyright and the fair use doctrine.
In deference to common law, however, the Court established a higher
standard for such fair use by narrowing its scope.94 However, the
Court's crucial language about the narrower scope of fair use when ap-
plied to unpublished works is ambiguous. Read with the Court's conces-
sion that one may take substantial quotations from published works, 9'
the narrower-scope language allows shorter quotations from unpublished
works. But read in light of the Court's concern with ensuring confidenti-
ality and creative control,96 the narrower-scope language could suggest
still more exacting limitations on the fair use of unpublished works.
Nonetheless, such a stringent reading would not cancel the Court's ac-
knowledgment that the fair use privilege applies to unpublished works. 97
Though it pronounced the unpublished nature of an infringed work
"critical," 98 the Court also held that it is "not necessarily determinative"
of the fair use question.99 The Court held that under "ordinary circum-
stances," fair use of unpublished sources is unlikely, t°° and, in so hold-
90. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
92. 471 U.S. at 542-43.
93. Id. at 563.
94. Id. at 564.
95. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
96. 471 U.S. at 564. "The right of first publication encompasses not only the choice whether to
publish at all, but also the choices of when, where, and in what form first to publish a work." Id.
97. Id. at 563.
98. Id. at 564.
99. Id. at 554.
100. Id. at 555.
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ing, implied that it might permit such fair use under extraordinary
circumstances, which remain undefined.101 Finally, the Court conceded
that "briefer quotes" from a work may be essential to convey the facts
sufficiently.10 2 Thus, Harper & Row furnishes a standard for fair use of
unpublished sources that reflects the concerns of common law copyright
but does not reproduce its absolute prohibition against copying from un-
published and undisseminated works.103
Like the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit in Salinger narrowed the
scope of the fair use privilege when applying it to unpublished works, but
concluded that narrow scope meant "diminished likelihood" of fair use,
so that unpublished works "normally enjoy complete protection against
copying. '' " That rule is a faulty and overly restrictive reading of
Harper & Row's "narrower scope" language.105 Conceding that a less
restrictive reading of that language is possible,"° the Salinger court de-
fended its more restrictive reading by claiming that it fits "the tenor of
the [Harper & Row] Court's entire discussion of unpublished works.""1 7
Because the court states that claim in conclusory terms, one cannot as-
sess the reasoning behind it. However, Salinger's restrictive gloss on
Harper & Row certainly fits the tenor of Salinger's entire discussion of
fair use. Since, under the first fair use factor, the Salinger court already
had held that an individual may take no more than "minimal amounts of
[unpublished] expressive conduct,"'0 8 the court could not insist on still
lower amounts for quotations from such sources under the second fair
use factor.
Salinger's minimal-amounts formula, therefore, is doubly unfortunate.
Applied to published sources it may be wrong, since Harper & Row al-
lows "even substantial quotations" from them." Applied to unpub-
lished letters in Salinger, the formula forced the court to adopt a rule far
sterner than that advanced in Harper & Row. 1° However, not even Sa-
101. 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 38, § 13.05[A], at 13-88.7 to 13-88.8.
102. 471 U.S. at 563 ("... . for example, Mr. Ford's characterization of the White House tapes as
the 'smoking gun' is perhaps so integral to the idea expressed as to be inseparable from it.").
103, See New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 593 (2d Cir. 1989)
(Oakes, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1168 (1990).
104. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 97.
105. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 82-83, 95-96 and accompanying text.
107. 811 F.2d at 97.
108. Id. at 96. See also supra text accompanying note 75.
109 471 U.S. at 564.
110. See Ralph Oman, Statement at The Joint Hearings on S. 2370 and H.R. 4263 Before the
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linger's restrictive rule that unpublished works "normally enjoy com-
plete protection"'' may be described as a per se rule against fair use of
unpublished sources.' 1 2 For, like the Supreme Court in Harper & Row,
the Second Circuit performed the four-factor fair use analysis mandated
in section 107 of the federal copyright law. The Salinger court thus ac-
knowledged that the fair use privilege applies to unpublished sources.
II. FAIR USE OF UNPUBLISHED SOURCES: JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL
DEBATES (1989-1990)
Salinger's application of Harper & Row is, at best, unsettled law in the
Second Circuit. The fair use of unpublished sources now has become the
subject of judicial and political debates occasioned by a later Second Cir-
cuit decision, New Era Publications International v. Henry Holt & Co. 113
These debates are important, for they indicate judicial support for the
view that Harper & Row accommodates fair use of unpublished text.' 4
A. The Second Circuit's New Era Decision: Judicial Debates
Like Salinger, New Era concerned a biography that quoted from its
subject's unpublished writings. 1 The court refused to enjoin the biogra-
phy's publication on the ground of plaintiff's laches. 16 Nevertheless, in
controversial dictum that Second Circuit Chief Judge Oakes later de-
scribed as "harmful language" at the "ultimate extreme,"117 the court
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 37-38 (July 11, 1990) (statement available from the House Subcomm. on Courts,
Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice). According to Oman, Register of Copy-
rights and Assistant Librarian for Copyright Services, "[t]his disagreement over the proper interpre-
tation of Harper & Row is critical .... for I believe it is at the crux of the concern that the Second
Circuit has created a virtual per se rule prohibiting fair use of unpublished works." See also infra
note 125 (for a critique of Salinger's rule by the Second Circuit's Chief Judge).
111. 811 F.2d at 97.
112. Cf. Catherine A. Diviney, Comment, Guardian of the Public Interest: An Alternative Appli-
cation of the Fair Use Doctrine in Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 615, 621
(1987) (Salinger "effectively puts unpublished copyrighted works beyond the reach of the fair use
doctrine").
113. 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989), cerL denied, 110 S. Ct. 1168 (1990).
114. See, eg., infira note 133 and accompanying text.
115. 873 F.2d at 576-78 (concerning RUSSELL MILLER, BARE-FACED MESSIAH: THE TRUE
STORY OF L. RON HUBBARD, a harshly critical biography about the Church of Scientology's
founder).
116. Id. at 577, 584-85.
117. James L. Oakes, Statement at The Joint Hearings on S. 2370 and H.R. 4263 Before the
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addressed the fair use questions before it.
In New Era, the court reaffirmed Salinger's rule that unpublished
works "normally enjoy complete protection.""'  However, the court fur-
ther narrowed that rule as it analyzed section 107's first and second fair
use factors. With respect to the first, the "purpose or character of the
use," '1 9 the court rejected as "unnecessary and unwarranted" any dis-
tinction between quoting to take the subject's prose and quoting to say
something about the subject's "character."120 Thus, New Era suggests
that even scholarly purposes cannot excuse authors who quote unpub-
lished sources. 1 '
Turning to the second statutory fair use factor, the "nature of the
copyrighted work,"' 22 the New Era court rejected any "distinction...
between the use of protected expression to liven text and the use of pro-
tected expression to communicate significant points about the sub-
ject."' 23 The Second Circuit found such an approach unnecessary. 124
New Era deeply divided the Second Circuit's judges. The Chief Judge
complained in a long concurrence that New Era interpreted Salinger's
overly restrictive rule as a virtual per se rule against any fair use of un-
published sources.'2 As public debate about New Era grew,' 26 five of
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary and the Subcom. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (July 11, 1990) (statement available from the House Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice).
118. 873 F.2d at 583.
119. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(1) (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). See supra note 3.
120. 873 F.2d at 583. Cf. New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493,
1507-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Leval, J.) (distinguishing "appropriations of the literary talent of the sub-
ject to enliven and improve the secondary work" from "instances ... where the critic exhibits chosen
words of the subject to prove a critical point or to demonstrate a flaw in the subject's character"),
aff'd, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1168 (1990). See also id. at 1502-03,
1508-20 (Judge Leval's reasoning for his functional distinction, and his analysis of the challenged
quotations in the biography at issue).
121. Qualifying this suggestion is the Second Circuit's concession that a book's scholarly pur-
pose should favor the book's publisher in a copyright infringement suit. 873 F.2d at 583.
122, 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(2) (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). See supra note 3.
123. 873 F.2d at 583 (quoting the trial court in New Era, 695 F. Supp. at 1504).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 593 (Oakes, C.J., concurring in the refusal to enjoin on the ground of plaintiff's
laches, but criticizing Judge Miner's fair use dictum). According to the Chief Judge, New Era's
dictum meant "that all copying from unpublished work is per se infringement." Id. Chief Judge
Oakes explained that New Era's fair use analysis misread Salinger's misreading of Harper & Row's
rule that "the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished works." Id. at 592 (quoting
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564). Salinger erred, according to the Chief Judge, by interpreting
"narrower" scope to mean the "diminished likelihood that copying will be fair use when the copy-
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the Second Circuit's twelve judges voted to rehear the case en banc, 127 a
remarkable move, since a prevailing party had brought the petition to
challenge dictum. 128 Writing for that minority, Judge Newman, Salin-
ger's author, urged his colleagues to correct the "misunderstanding" of
authors and publishers convinced that the Second Circuit had outlawed
the use of unpublished materials in "scholarly research, biography and
journalism."' 12 9
When the Second Circuit refused to rehear the case, the Salinger and
New Era judges took their differences into law school lecture rooms and
law reviews.' 30 Judge Newman continued his campaign against New Era
by urging publishers and their lawyers to challenge the decision in future
litigation. '
These judicial debates suggest that New Era's fair use dictum is not
likely to become law in the Second Circuit. By refusing to rehear New
Era, the majority was not necessarily endorsing its fair use dictum.
Courts do not customarily grant petitions that prevailing parties lodge to
challenge dictum.'32 Thus, even the majority may have included judges
who, like the dissenters, feared that New Era subverts the Harper & Row-
Salinger principle that fair use allows quotation even from unpublished
sources when "necessary" to document facts.' 33
Indeed, some Second Circuit judges may go further still, and confine
righted material is unpublished" and by not reading the Court's language to allow the copying of a
diminished amount of text. Id. at 592-93 (quoting Salinger, 811 F.2d at 97) (emphasis added). See
supra notes 81-85, 105-108 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
127. New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 884 F.2d 659, 662 (2d Cir. 1989) (New-
man, 3., dissenting from denial of petition to grant rehearing en banc).
128. See Statement of Oman, supra note 110, at 47 n.139.
129. Id.
130. Pierre N. Leval, the Southern District of New York judge who found fair use rather than
copyright infringement in both the Salinger and New Era cases, has twice restated and refined his
views on the fair use doctrine. See Leval, supra note 42; Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Stan-
dard, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1105 (1990). See also Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: 4 Comment on the
Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1137 (1990) (a rejoinder to Leval).
The Second Circuit judges who wrote Salinger and New Era also have used lectures and articles to
re-examine the issues those decisions raised. See Roger . Miner, Exploiting Stolen Text: Fair Use or
Foul Play?, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1 (1989); Jon 0. Newman, Not the End offHistory: The Second
Circuit Struggles with Fair Use, 37 3. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 12 (1989). See also Newman, supra note 47.
131. Newman, supra note 130, at 17-18. Judge Newman urged publishers not to lapse into self-
censorship to avoid the suits that subjects of biographies might bring. Id. at 17.
132. See supra note 128.
133. 884 F.2d at 663.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss4/8
FAIR USE OF UNPUBLISHED WORKS
Salinger to its facts on the ground that its privacy implications1 34 distin-
guish it from ordinary fair use lawsuits against biographers.3 5  Should
the Second Circuit refuse to take that step, since even statutory copyright
protection may serve to protect privacy, 136 it is still likely that the court
will remove New Era's gloss on Salinger. That likelihood is especially
important since it is by no means certain that supporters of a liberalized
fair use provision can persuade Congress to adopt such a measure. 137
B. The Congressional Response to New Era: Proposals to Amend
Section 107 (1990-1991)
On March 10, 1990, Representative Robert Kastenmeier of Wisconsin
introduced a bill adding four words to section 107. The altered provision
would have read: ".. . the fair use of a copyrighted work, whether pub-
lished or unpublished, ... is not an infringement of copyright." 3 ' On
March 29, Senators Paul Simon of Illinois and Patrick Leahy of Vermont
introduced similar legislation in the Senate.13 9 Senator Simon identified
the bill's purpose as overruling New Era's fair use dictum"4 because the
dictum "suggests that virtually any quotation of unpublished materials is
an infringement of copyright, and not fair use." 141
The Simon-Kastenmeier legislation had a short but eventful life before
it died in committee in October 1990.142 In July it was the subject of
legislative hearings at which Second Circuit judges testified along with
134. New Era, 873 F.2d at 585 (Oakes, C.J., concurring) ("Salinger is a decision which, even if
rightly decided on its facts, involved underlying, if latent, privacy implications not present here").
Accord Abrams, supra note 18, at 3 (". . . I would, if I could, construct a Salinger exception to the
fair use doctrine, one which would provide that where someone has demonstrated so consistently for
so long his devotion to personal privacy ... that no part of his letters should be quoted at all without
his permission. Pre or post-publication."). See also Christopher A. Murphy, Comment, Salinger v.
Random House: The Author's Interests in Unpublished Materials, 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
103, 126-27 (1987) (including the privacy interest among the authorial interests Salinger protects).
135. 873 F.2d at 589-91 (Oakes, C.J., concurring) (analysis of Second Circuit biography cases).
136. See infra note 165 and accompanying text (on the privacy interests now served by statutory
copyright).
137. See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text (for a discussion of an earlier failed attempt
to pass such legislation).
138. H.R. 4263, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). See supra note 3.
139. S. 2370, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
140. 136 CONG. REC. S3549 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1990) (statement of Sen. Simon).
141. Id. New Era, Senator Simon warned, raises the "spectre of historical and literary figures
and their heirs exercising an effective censorship power over unflattering portrayals," and creates
conditions in which "scholars and historians can be prohibited from citing primary sources." Id.
142. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
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historians, copyright experts, and representatives of computer industry
interests. 143 Fearing that the legislation might expose unpublished
software and source code' 44 to copying, some members of the computer
industry sought to restrict or even to defeat the bis. 145 To that end,
they argued that any scheme allowing fair use of unpublished material
would violate the Berne Convention, the international agreement on in-
tellectual property, which the United States joined by treaty in 1988, and
which became effective on March 1, 1989.146 Other witnesses who ad-
143. Joint Hearings, supra note 48. See also supra notes 110 and 117. For brief summaries of
statements and testimony, see Copyright Official Urges Subcommittee to be Specific in Drafting "Fair
Use" Bill, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 134, at A-10 (July 12, 1990). See also Ralph
Oman, Protecting Franny and Zooey: Publishing: An Overhaul of Copyright Law Would Settle the
Dispute About Access to Unpublished Material, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 1990, at B7 (authored by the
U.S. Register of Copyrights).
144. "Source code" is a computer program in a high-level language, such as Pascal. It is com-
monly distinguished from "object code," which is a machine-made, machine-readable-only transla-
tion of "source code" into the binary numerical language of the computer. See David Einhorn, The
Scope of Computer Software Copyrights, in COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOSIUM NUMBER THIRTY-FIVE
113, 115-16 n.13 (ASCAP 1988).
145. Computer industry opposition was evident from the start of the legislative process. In in-
troducing their legislation, Senators Simon and Leahy pledged to work with computer industry in-
terests to ensure that the legislation would not weaken the protection of computer programs. See
136 CONG. REc. S3550 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1990). However, members of the computer industry were
divided in their reactions to the proposed legislation. One trade association opposed the legislation
in the hope of maintaining absolute protection for software, notably for source code. See James M.
Burger, Chief Counsel, Government, of Apple Computer, Inc. on behalf of the Computer and Busi-
ness Equipment Manufacturer Association (CBEMA) and the Software Publishers Association
(SPA), Statement at The Joint Hearings on S. 2370 and H.R. 4263 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Courts,
Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 16, 19-24, 29 (July 11, 1990) (statement available from the House Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice).
However, another computer industry trade association supported the Simon-Kastenmeier legisla-
tion. This group hoped to ensure fair use copying of unpublished source code, on the ground that
source code is "functional" and, therefore, factual material not eligible for copyright protection. See
A.G.W. Biddle, President, Computer & Communications Industry Association, Statement at The
Joint Hearings on S. 2370 and HR. 4263 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trade-
marks of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and
the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, 4 (July
11, 1990) (statement available from the House Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the
Administration of Justice). For a definition of "source code," see supra note 144.
146. See Statement of J. Burger, supra note 145, at 24-27. See also Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act, 1971), S. TREATY Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1986); Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853.
In his statement for computer industry interests opposing the Simon-Kastenmeier bills, Burger
argued that the proposed legislation would violate the Berne Convention in two ways. First, he
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dressed the question disagreed.147
argued, the bills would violate Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, by permitting fair use of unpub-
lished works and "confidential business plans," which, Burger maintained, Article 9(2) protected.
Statement of J. Burger, supra note 145, at 27.
However, Burger's claim that copyright law and Berne protect business plans is debatable. Fed-
eral "copyright protection" does not "extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery." 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). Fur-
thermore, other legal means protect trade secrets. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470 (1974) (state trade secret law can protect even unpatented industrial technologies). Berne
grants "[a]uthors of literary and artistic works" an "exclusive right of authorizing [their] reproduc-
tion." But Article 9(2), to which Burger alluded in his statement, qualifies that right in a manner
recalling Anglo-American fair use doctrine. Article 9 of the Berne Convention, supra. The Berne
Convention explains that "[i]t shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit
the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the author." Id. That language need not preclude fair use of unpublished works under
federal copyright law as the Supreme Court interpreted in Harper & Row. In Harper & Row, the
legitimate authorial interests of unpublished works were of particular concern to the Court. 471
U.S. at 564 (interests in confidentiality and creative control).
According to Burger, the Simon-Kastenmeier bills also would violate Article 10(1) of the Berne
Convention. Statement of J. Burger, supra note 145, at 27. Under Article 10(1),
It shall be permissible to make quotations from a work which has already been lawfully
made available to the public, provided that their making is compatible with fair practice,
and their extent does not exceed that justified by the purpose, including quotations from
newspaper articles and periodicals in the form of press summaries.
Berne Convention, supra. Burger argued that the materials quoted in Harper & Row, Salinger and
New Era had not been "lawfully made available to the public" within the meaning of Article 10(1).
Statement of J. Burger, supra note 145, at 27. However, such factual determinations need not impair
the principle that, under other factual circumstances, quoting or paraphrasing unpublished works
may indeed constitute fair use under copyright law, or fair practice under Berne.
147. One copyright expert, Barbara Ringer, opposed the Simon-Kastenmeier bills yet believed
that they would comply with Berne if amended. See Statement of B. Ringer, supra note 48, at 6
(unlimited fair use of unpublished works would violate Berne's Article 10(1) but "a narrow provision
might well represent one of the 'certain special cases' in which unauthorized reproductions are al-
lowed under Article 9(2)"). Ringer attacked the Simon-Kastenmeier bills as "too broad" and as
having possibly "mischievous effects" on copyright law. Id. at 1. She conceded, however, that au-
thors need reassurance that there is "no such thing as a per se rule" against quoting unpublished
sources. Id.
Ralph Oman, a supporter of the Simon-Kastenmeier legislation, also recommended that the fair
use legislation include a published-unpublished distinction and argued that any such legislation, by
retaining case-by-case fair use analysis, would meet the "special cases," "normal exploitation," and
"legitimate interests" requirements of Berne's Article 10(1). Statement of R. Oman, supra note 110,
at 54-56; Berne Convention, supra note 146. For a still bolder argument that the Simon-Kas-
tenmeier bills were consistent with Berne, precisely because neither establishes a published-unpub-
lished distinction, see Floyd Abrams, Statement at The Joint Hearings on S. 2370 and H.R. 4263
Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary
and the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23 (July 11, 1990) (statement available from the
House Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice). According
to Abrams, the "right of authorizing ... reproduction" that the Convention's Article 9(1) grants
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By summer's end, computer industry negotiators got what they
wanted: compromise legislation, acceptable to representatives of the pub-
lishing industry, that completely excluded the fair use of unpublished
software and restricted the fair use of any unpublished materials to "his-
tory, biography, fiction, news and general interest reporting, or social,
political or moral commentary."' 148 However, even the compromise leg-
islation failed. 49 In October 1990, Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah blocked
Senator Simon's bill in committee and effectively killed it.'50
The testimony and negotiations of 1990 reveal that the Berne Conven-
fion is not an insurmountable obstacle to the fair use of unpublished
materials. Nor, in principle, is the requirement that unpublished
software, source code, and business records enjoy special protection from
copying. Careful tailoring of the fair use doctrine can overcome those
obstacles, as Senator Simon tries again to pass legislation ensuring the
fair use of unpublished sources.' 51 Because Congressional action is un-
certain, however, it is prudent to consider a judicial strategy for defining
and ensuring the fair use of unpublished sources.
III. FAIR USE OF UNPUBLISHED SOURCES: COPYRIGHT POLICY
AND FUTURE JUDICIAL INQUIRY
Existing law does not preclude the fair use of unpublished works. 15 It
remains to be seen, however, how courts in fact may find fair use of such
materials. Damaging though it is, New Era's fair use dictum is not law.
However, Salinger's overly restrictive gloss on Harper & Row, the rule
that unpublished works "normally enjoy complete protection against
authors, Berne Convention, supra note 146, is not equivalent to the right of first publication granted
authors in Anglo-American copyright law. In fact it provides less protection. Statement of F.
Abrams, supra, at 22-23.
In any case, even under Berne, American law governs. As Abrams observed, id. at 18-19, the
provisions of the Berne Convention are "not self-executing." Berne Convention Implementation
Act, supra note 146, at § 2(1). Rather, they depend for their force on "appropriate domestic law,"
id. at § 2(2), and may only be enforced in actions under American law. Id. at §§ 2(3), 3(1), 4(a)(3).
148. Roger Cohen, Software Issue Kills Bill to Ease Copyright Laws, N.Y. TImm, Oct. 13, 1990,
at 1, 9.
149. Id. at 9.
150. Id. Senator Hatch called the legislation premature and in need of further study. However,
The New York Times explained Hatch's action as a response to computer-industry lobbying. Id.
151. In October 1990, Senator Simon lamented that his legislation was "dead in the water." Id.
at 1. However, he has since reintroduced his proposed legislation. See supra note 16.
152. See supra notes 103, 111-12 and accompanying text.
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copying,"'5 3 is currently the law of the Second Circuit. And even if the
Second Circuit revises that rule,1 -4 other problems will remain.
The fair use doctrine is an "equitable rule of reason" that resists gener-
alization, permits only fact-specific determinations, and requires that
courts apply traditional "criteria" or factors of analysis and "balanc[e]
the equities" as best they can.' 55 Thus, even under familiar circum-
stances, judicial fair use determinations are difficult.
Such determinations are harder still for a court applying the fair use
privilege to unpublished sources. In this situation, the court enters com-
paratively uncharted territory where, in the absence of any precedent in
favor of fair use, it must consider the policies that underlie the copyright
and fair use doctrines.
Those policies are disparate and potentially conflicting. Some com-
mentators impose theoretical unity upon the field by insisting that copy-
right law serves, or should serve, only one policy: for example, the
utilitarian policy of encouraging cultural productivity.'56 Reducing
copyright policy to a single principle, however, will not make fair use
doctrine easier to apply. Fair use will remain a rule of reason that even
the proponents of a simplified copyright theory may want to retain to
handle the variety and complexity of fair use litigation. 157
If, however, one accepts that copyright and fair use serve multiple pol-
icies, one exchanges an elusive theoretical unity for the possibility of re-
fining the fair use doctrine to enable courts equitably to resolve claims for
the fair use of unpublished sources. The following pages undertake this
task by analyzing the fair use inquiry mandated by the federal copyright
statute in light of the multiple policies that copyright and fair use serve.
A. Copyright Policy and its Applications
The debates occasioned by Harper & Row, Salinger, and New Era
153. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 97. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 110 and 125 (for authorities who have criticized the rule, including the
Second Circuit's chief judge).
155. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 26. But see Leval, supra note 43, at 176 (it is "misinforma-
tion" to call fair use an "equitable rule of reason," because "it originated in the law courts as a
utilitarian limit on the author's monopoly") (citation omitted).
156. See, eg., Leval, supra note 130, at 1105-06 (utility should be sole standard in fair use
analysis).
157. See, e-g., Leval, supra note 43, at 167, 170-75 (admitting that § 107's factors are "opaque
and uninformative," yet retaining the factors and interpreting them in light of a utilitarian theory of
copyright).
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have focused attention on the diverse policies behind copyright law.
Though they have long legal pedigrees, these policies have renewed rele-
vance in New Era's aftermath, as the task of refining fair use doctrine
proceeds.
As one writer observes, "[t]he utilitarian theory... is undoubtedly the
most venerable and oft-recited of the justifications for the American law
of intellectual property." '58 According to this theory, which rests solidly
on language found in British legislation, the Federal Constitution, and
case law,'59 copyright protection enhances society's cultural wealth by
giving authors incentives to produce it: that is, the right to profit from
their published works. 6° The protection espoused under this theory ex-
tends not only to published works but also to unpublished works for the
same reason: to protect "the process of creat[ing]... published works"
and thereby encourage the production of cultural wealth. 161 Copyright's
158. Fisher, supra note 2, at 1688. See also Dratler, supra note 2, at 245-48 (stressing copyright
law's utilitarian goal of maximizing cultural productivity).
159. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
160. The most vigorous proponent of the utilitarian theory is Judge Leval. See Leval, supra note
43, at 170 (". . . the governing purpose of the copyright law, the promotion of the progress of the
Arts and the advancement of learning, justifies both the artist's monopoly and the limitations on that
monopoly in favor of the fair user.").
161. Kernochan, supra note 48, at 322. Proponents of the Simon-Kastenmeier Legislation en-
listed the utilitarian theory to support that measure. They denied that it would deprive unpublished
works of protection. Consider, for example, the congressional testimony of Judge Leval:
Another canard that should be refuted is that under this bill, authors will have no protec-
tion for unpublished drafts that they prefer not to publish .... Unpublished drafts will
continue to be protected upon a full analysis of the fair use factors. The fact that fair use
may be made in compelling circumstances of limited amounts of unpublished matter, as
would be the case under this bill, does not justify the fear that authors' unpublished drafts
will be unprotected form wholesale theft.
Pierre N. Leval, U.S. District Judge, Southern District of New York, Statement at The Joint Hear-
ings on S. 2370 and H.R. 4263 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Adminis-
tration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (July 11, 1990)
(statement available from the House Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Adminis-
tration of Justice).
Proponents of the legislation additionally maintained that it would promote cultural productivity
by protecting authors seeking the use of unpublished sources from "widow censors" who might
block that use under restrictive doctrines like that of New Era. Leval, supra note 43, at 172 (warn-
ing that Salinger and New Era establish "a new powerful potentate in the politics of intellectual life,
the widow censor. For 50 years after death, an historian who wishes to quote personal papers of
deceased public figures now must satisfy heirs and executors."). In his statement prepared for the
legislative hearings of July 1990, historian Taylor Branch wrote of the "unpleasant choices I now
face, negotiation with those who control rights in unpublished historical materials, or self-censorship
to avert the risk of lawsuits and damages." Taylor Branch, Statement at The Joint Hearings on S.
2370 and H.R. 4263 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Senate
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utilitarian policy provides the theory most favorable to a liberal fair use
standard, allowing the use of unpublished works.
Subserving the utilitarian theory of copyright is the theory that copy-
right is a "property" right prior to any utilitarian purpose that the right
might serve. With historical credentials of its own in English and Ameri-
can case law, this theory explains the common law's right of first publica-
tion as the result and the reward of an author's labor.162 Since an
author's labor creates and controls intellectual property, this theory sug-
gests that copyright infringement robs and destroys intellectual
property.' 63
Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (July 11, 1990) (statement
available from the House Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of
Justice).
Some of the bills' proponents also pointed out the logistical difficulties of getting consent to use
scattered unpublished sources from dispersed copyright owners. According to Branch, most of the
documents he used as a historian of Martin Luther King's civil rights movement "were authored by
common people whose [sic] wrote without any thought of economic gain." Id. at 7. That remark
suggests, whether or not Branch so intended, that rights to exploit a text by publishing it and the
possible impact on those rights of quoting from that text always need to be considered, even when
the text is not written primarily for pecuniary gain. But § 107's fourth fair use factor, market effect,
already acknowledges such rights. See supra note 3.
162. See generally PATRY, supra note 1, at 436-39 (English cases), 439-41 (American state com-
mon law cases). For a classic statement of the theory of common law copyright, see Lord Mans-
field's opinion in Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303 (K.B. 1769):
From what source ... is the common law drawn, which is admitted to be so clear, in
respect of the copy before publication?
From this argument, because it is just, that an author should reap the pecuniary profits
of his own ingenuity and labour. It is just, that another should not use his name, without
his consent. It is fit that he should judge when to publish, or whether he ever will publish.
It is fit he should not only choose the time, but the manner of publication; how many; what
volume; what print. It is fit, he should choose to whose care he will trust the accuracy and
correctness of the impression; in whose honesty he will confide, not to foist in additions;
with other reasonings of the same effect.
Id. at 2398.
163. Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. ABC, 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The fair
use doctrine is not a license for corporate theft, empowering a court to ignore a copyright whenever
it determines the underlying work contains material of possible public importance."); Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) ("If so much is taken, that the value of
the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially to an injuri-
ous extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient, in point of law, to constitute a piracy pro
tanto."). Opponents of the Simon-Kastenmeier legislation relied on this second theory to insist,
insofar as the federal copyright statute allowed them, that unpublished works are largely immune
from fair use thanks to the common law right of first publication. Statement of B. Ringer, supra
note 48, at 3 (common law copyright is not "'a right of privacy" but "a right of property, derived
from authors' historic rights to control the first dissemination of their works"). See also Jonathan
W. Lubell, Statement at The Joint Hearings on S. 2370 and H.R. 4263 Before the Subcomm. on
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According to a third and final theory, common law copyright protects
privacy. "Privacy" may be that of an individual who does not want to
publish at all,' 6 or that of a writer who does want to publish eventually,
but only after a long process of textual refining and rethinking undis-
turbed by intrusive public attention. In this second case, authorship and
creative control rights need and deserve special legal protection. 165
The boundaries between these enumerated theories of copyright are
unclear.1 66  Nevertheless, courts should distinguish them. They can
Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (July 11, 1990) (statement available from the House Subcomm. on Courts,
Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice) ("an unpublished work has a different
meaning and impact than published works in regard to the creative process and the marketing of
artistic works" and therefore deserves a higher level of protection from fair use). New Era's author,
Judge Roger Miner, is the strongest exponent of this view. Though he concedes that the federal
copyright statute abolished the dual copyright regime under which unpublished works at one time
enjoyed absolute immunity from fair use, he pleads that it be restored to secure the property rights of
authors in their still-unpublished and undisseminated work. Miner, supra note 130, at 2, 4, 8; Roger
J. Miner, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit, Prepared Statement at The Joint Hearings on S.
2370 and H.R. 4263 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration
of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (July 11, 1990) (statement
available from the House Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of
Justice).
164. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis J. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
198-205 (1890). Admitting that cases involving unpublished works appear to be based on the "nar-
row grounds" of protecting property, the authors nevertheless find in those cases "recognitions of a
more liberal doctrine." Id. at 204.
[ihe protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed through the
medium of writing or of the arts, so far as it consists in preventing publication, is merely an
instance of the enforcement of the more general right of the individual to be let alone....
The principle which protects personal writings and all other personal productions, not
against theft and physical appropriation, but against publication in any form, is in reality
not the principle of private property, but that of an inviolate personality.
Id. at 205.
165. This was the Supreme Court's concern in Harper & Row, when it held that copyright pro-
tects the confidentiality and creative control of authors. 471 U.S. at 564. See also Kernochan, supra
note 48, at 322, 326-27 (privacy for creativity), 325 (general right of privacy); Weinreb, supra note
130, at 1145-46 (conceding that a utilitarian theory of fair use could accommodate a right of privacy
that protects creative authors, but advocating a still broader fairness theory of fair use that would
protect the privacy of ordinary persons as well). Butsee Leval, supra note 43, at 178-79 (the protec-
tion of privacy is not properly a function of federal copyright law because constitutional and state
law assume that task).
A particularly strenuous proponent of reviving copyright law's protection for privacy is Judge Jon
Newman, who wrote the Second Circuit's decision in Salinger. See Newman, supra note 48, at 460.
166. Under the privacy theory, copyright law protects interests beyond the concern of the utilita-
rian and property theories of copyright. Yet to the extent that the privacy protected is authorial and
not just personal, privacy theory approaches the property theory of common law copyright. Simi-
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favor divergent interests that courts must balance and between which
courts must choose. Since balancing the equities is the essence of fair use
analysis, 16 7 judicial alertness to copyright's competing policies will
strengthen judicial inquiries into the competing equities of fair use.
B. Fair Use of Unpublished Works: Toward a New Judicial Inquiry
Strong language in Harper & Row and Salinger may suggest that a
court should not find fair use when the text quoted is unpublished. 168
However, courts need not put a "heavy thumb on the equitable scale"
before they consider the fair use of an unpublished work.169 Neither
Harper & Row nor Salinger really did so, for they proposed not a double
standard but a single standard of fair use, applicable to both published
and unpublished works alike, yet responsive to the latter's special
"nature." 17 0
However, applying the four-factor inquiry section 107 mandates71 has
problems. Indeed, one commentator complains that the statute's fair use
inquiry is "protean" and should be replaced by a "functional" market-
impairment test that would inquire into whether the infringing work re-
places the infringed work and thereby damages its market. 72 Another
commentator believes that courts may count market impact twice in ana-
lyzing fair use claims: once under section 107's market-effect factor, and
larly, to the extent that privacy theory seeks to protect and encourage creativity, it approaches the
utilitarian theory paramount in statutory copyright.
167. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
168. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 555 ("Under ordinary circumstances, the author's right to
control the first public appearance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of fair
use."); Salinger, 811 F.2d at 97 (". . . we think that the tenor of the Court's entire discussion of
unpublished works conveys the idea that such works normally enjoy complete protection against
copying any protected expression.").
169. Statement of F. Abrams, supra note 147, at 23 (quoting and commenting on the statement
in Harper & Row that, for unpublished works, "the balance of equities in evaluating.., a claim of
fair use inevitably shifts," 471 U.S. at 553).
170. See supra notes 90-112 and accompanying text.
171. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). See supra note 3.
172. 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 38, § 13.05[A], at 13-88.18, § 13.05[], at 13-88.18
to 13-90.6. According to the authors, "if regardless of medium, the defendant's work, although
containing substantially similar material, performs a different function than that of the plaintiff's,
the defense of fair use may be invoked." Id. at 13-88.20 (citation omitted).
The earliest fair use cases used Nimmer's functional test. See, e.g., Statement of R. Oman, supra
, ote 110, at 7-8 (a "review will not in general serve as a substitute for the book reviewed; and even
there, if so much is extracted that it communicates the same knowledge with the original work, it is
an actual violation of literary property.') (quoting Roworth v. Wilkes, 1 Camp. 94, 98 (1807)).
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once again under the provision's purpose factor. 173
These problems are not irremediable. To correct them and adapt sec-
tion 107 to questions involving the fair use of unpublished works, courts
may identify the policy each statutory factor serves. Doing so may help
courts distinguish the statutory factors, and refine the tools for adjudicat-
ing claims of fair use of unpublished works.
1. Arguments for the Fair Use of Unpublished Works: "Purpose
and Character of the Use" and Copyright Law's Utilitarian
Policy
Section 107's first factor, the "purpose and character of the use,"' 174
allows users of copyrighted material to make their strongest arguments
for fair use. A user's purpose may help to justify an infringing use, as
long as that user's purpose serves copyright's utilitarian policy of maxi-
mizing society's cultural wealth. 1 7 5
Section 107's first sentence evidences Congress' expectations that some
purposes would count heavily in favor of fair use. Even before listing the
four factors of fair use analysis, section 107 states that copying "for pur-
poses such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching... , scholar-
ship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright."'' 76 That language
does not establish any presumption that certain uses are fair uses.177 Sec-
tion 107 mandates a multi-factor inquiry and directs courts to weigh
other, nonpurpose factors. 178 The statute's list of innocent cultural pur-
poses signals, at the very least, however, Congress' desire to encourage
them, in keeping with copyright's utilitarian policy.
Congress, however, did not intend an exclusive list of commendable
purposes. 7 9 Other purposes may serve copyright's utilitarian policy of
cultural enrichment, provided they are productive or transformative:
that is, purposes to create new works rather than to reproduce old ones.
173. Fisher, supra note 2, at 1672.
174. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(1) (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). See supra note 3.
175. See supra notes 156, 158-61.
176. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). See supra note 3.
177. According to the Supreme Court in Harper & Row, § 107's first sentence does not create
presumptive categories of fair use but only suggests "activities the courts might regard as fair use
under the circumstances." 471 U.S. at 561 (quoting S. REP. No. 473, supra note 31, at 61).
178. See supra note 40.
179. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 26, at 5680 ("The statement of the fair use doctrine in
section 107 offers some guidance.... However, the endless variety of situations and combinations of
circumstances that can rise in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact rules in the
statute.").
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While the Supreme Court has stated that productivity alone cannot de-
termine fair use decisions, the Court has retained the productivity test.180
Therefore, that test remains to enable courts to apply the fair use privi-
lege to factual reporting by journalists"'1 and biographers.1 82 Further-
more, facts are not copyrightable, 8 3 and authors may quote unpublished
text when necessary to communicate facts. 84
But the fair use of unpublished works may extend further still. In sec-
tion 107's first sentence, Congress listed uses that may not constitute in-
fringement, among them "criticism." '185 Congress thereby suggested that
quoting may be permissible not only when necessary to convey facts, but
also when necessary to analyze or criticize text in a secondary but inde-
pendently productive work of criticism. Critics commonly apply their
acumen to literary texts whose authors have published them and have
thereby exposed them to criticism. Authors of unpublished works, how-
ever, have not exposed their work to criticism and the author's right to
private creative control of a text in progress should trump a fair use
claim based on criticism. Still, a commentator may have a stronger fair
use argument when he or she must not only quote from unpublished text
but also comment critically upon it to establish a fact.18 6
If section 107's purpose factor serves copyright's utilitarian policy,
180. One commentator claims that the Supreme Court has ignored and thereby "subordinated"
the productivity test. Fisher, supra note 2, at 1686. He explains that "[i]t would be an exaggeration
to say that the decisions in Sony and Harper & Row have expunged the concept of productivity from
fair use doctrine. In combination, however, the two decisions have sharply reduced the role played
by this factor." Id. On the productivity test, see generally id. at 1684-86; Leval, supra note 43, at
170-72; Leval, supra note 130, at 1111-16. See also Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984) ("The distinction between 'nonproductive' and 'productive'
uses may be helpful in calibrating the balance, but it cannot be wholly determinative."). Sony held
that mere video-taping of television broadcasts for a private viewer's convenience constitutes fair use.
Id. at 454-55. A fortiori, a use that may be said to be productive would be fair, other things being
equal.
181. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561. Cf. Fisher, supra note 2, at 1684-85 (complaining that the
Supreme Court in Sony subordinated the productivity test and came close to declaring it irrelevant).
182. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 96.
183. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560; 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (West 1977 & Supp. 1991).
184. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561, 563; Salinger, 811 F.2d at 96. See also New Era, 884 F.2d
at 663 (Newman, J., dissenting); Leval, supra note 130, at 1115 n.51; Newman, supra note 130, at
14-15.
185. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). See supra note 3.
186. Consider the remarks of the Second Circuit's chief judge:
[A] biographer or critic [may use] protected expression as a fact to prove a character trait
that is at odds with the public image that the [biography's] subject or the subject's support-
ers have attempted to project. As Judge Leval said, it may be "the words used by [a] public
figure (or the particular manner of expression) that are the facts calling for comment."
Washington University Open Scholarship
1260 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 69:1231
that policy must guide courts when they ask, as section 107 requires,
"whether [a challenged] use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes." '187 This language suggests that if an infringer's
motives are commercial, her use is presumptively, though not necessar-
ily, unfair.188 However, a user's commercial purpose may not be her
only purpose, and the use itself may, in any case, serve the first statutory
factor's utilitarian policy. Here, under a potentially applicable Second
Circuit test, commercial motives will defeat a fair use claim only if they
outweigh two factors: the public interest in the subject matter disclosed
and the necessity for using the protected material (i.e. the absence of
alternatives). 18 9
Within the Harper & Row and Salinger framework, therefore, a court
may consider a wide range of culturally productive or transformative
purposes under section 107's first fair use factor.
2. Arguments Against Fair Use of Unpublished Sources: The
Second, Third, and Fourth Statutory Fair Use Factors and
Countervailing Policies of Copyright Law
Whereas section 107's first fair use factor permits users to make argu-
New Era, 873 F.2d at 592 (Oakes, C.J., concurring) (quoting New Era, 695 F. Supp. at 1502-04)
(emphasis in original).
187. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(1) (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). See supra note 3.
188. According to the Supreme Court, commercial motives raise a presumption against fair use:
"The fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends
to weigh against a finding of fair use. '[E]very commercial use of copyrighted material is presump-
tively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright.'"
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562 (quoting Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S.
417, 451 (1983)).
A related rationale for rejecting a fair use claim is the infringer's commercial or professional bad
faith. Thus, if "the 'propriety of the defendant's conduct'" is questionable, the use is probably
unfair. Id. (quoting 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 38, § 13.05[A], at 13-88.3). Id. at 562-
63 ("fair use presupposes 'good faith' and 'fair dealing'.") (citing Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc.,
293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (quoting John Schulman, Fair Use and the Revision of the
Copyright Act, 53 IowA L. REv. 832 (1968))). However, commentators have attacked the bad faith
inquiry as unmanageable and irrelevant to fair use analysis. The inquiry may be unmanageable,
because it is unclear what standard of fairness or good faith courts should apply under Harper &
Row. Fisher, supra note 2, at 1679-82. Above all, the bad faith inquiry may be irrelevant insofar as
copyright's utilitarian policy should govern the inquiry. Leval, supra note 43, at 176.
189. For an authoritative line of Second Circuit cases so holding, see Iowa State Univ. Research
Found., Inc. v. ABC, 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1070 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366
F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). See also New Era, 873 F.2d at 589-
91 (Oakes, C.J., concurring) (explaining the above cited cases); PATRY, supra note I, at 72-91.
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ments in favor of fair use, the three remaining factors, the "nature" of the
copyrighted work, the "amount and substantiality" of the copied matter,
and the market effect of the infringement,"9° give copyright owners their
best chance to argue against fair use. While the first factor serves the
utilitarian policy of copyright law and fair use, the remaining three fac-
tors serve potentially adverse policies: protecting the market incentives
and property rights of authors and protecting personal and authorial
privacy. 191
Of the remaining three factors, the "nature of the copyrighted
work"' 92 matters most for the fair use of unpublished works. In analyz-
ing this factor, both Harper & Row and Salinger held that a work's un-
published status is "a critical element of its 'nature'" and narrows the
"scope" of fair use.193 The Second Circuit may retreat from Salinger's
further holding that unpublished works "normally enjoy complete pro-
tection against copying,"' 194 to permit the shorter quotations from unpub-
lished sources that Harper & Row allows.' 95 But courts still will need to
consider the policies that the Supreme Court sought to serve in Harper &
Row: the protection of literary property and authorial privacy, policies
the Court served by ensuring the author's "right of first publication" and
the "copyright holder's interests in confidentiality and creative
control." 19 6
So understood, fair use analysis of the unpublished nature of an in-
fringed work has scarcely begun. With respect to the protection of per-
sonal and authorial privacy, however, it is already clear that judicial
inquiry must focus on access to the copied text. Judge Newman suggests
a spectrum along which courts might measure access, stretching from
190. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(2)-(4) (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). See supra note 3.
191. See Fisher, supra note 2, at 1686-93 (describing the multiple policies served by copyright
law, but deploring what the author takes to be the result: inconsistent fair use doctrine). Fisher
writes: "The current fair-use doctrine . .. helps perpetuate the problem, by reinforcing the impres-
sion that, when confronted with a question of public policy, we can do no better than balance incon-
sistent claims derived from conventional, incommensurable premises." Id. at 1695. But he adds,
'[t]his is not to suggest.., that a well-built fair use doctrine would solve our quandary, but every
incoherent field of law represents both a part of the problem and a neglected opportunity to begin to
solve it." Id. at n.178. That qualifying remark admits that the conflicts between the several policies
served by copyright law are irreducible and so must be balanced. That, in any case, is the underlying
premise of this Note.
192. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(2) (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). See supra note 3.
193. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564; Salinger, 811 F.2d at 97.
194. 811 F.2d at 97. See also supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
195. 471 U.S. at 564. See also supra note 68.
196. 471 U.S. at 564.
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theft of restricted material to permission to use "deliberately shared"
text.197 Under this privacy theory it is relevant that, in Harper & Row,
The Nation used a confidential "purloined manuscript." 198 It may be
equally relevant that, in Salinger, a biographer quoted from the novelist's
letters after promising the libraries holding them that he would not quote
them without permission. 199 However, a privacy claim in Salinger is
weaker since the works in question were already dispatched (and there-
fore disseminated) letters. °° As these examples indicate, confidentiality
and the reserved right to consent to copying may be conditions of access
to which courts must be alert.201
The infringed work's unpublished nature also may require that courts
focus their fair use analyses on an author's rights to artistic control and
first publication. These are values of authorial privacy that common law
copyright formerly protected and, thanks to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Harper & Row, that federal copyright law now protects.20 2
But when quoting from an unpublished work does not undermine a
personal or authorial privacy interest sought to be protected, courts may
consider countervailing arguments for fair use. First, the Harper & Row
Court affirmed copyright law's distinction between protectible expression
and unprotectible facts, and allowed quoting from unpublished works to
197. Newman, supra note 48, at 474.
198. Miner, supra note 131, at 4 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563). See also Harper &
Row, 471 U.S. at 564 (on the Ford memoirs' "confidential" status).
199. Miner, supra note 130, at 4-5.
200. See Roger L. Zissu, Salinger and Random House: Good News and Bad News, 35 J. CoPY-
RIGHT Soc'' 13, 15 (1987) (access is relevant, but when, as in Salinger, the unpublished work is
already in a library and available for public inspection, access should not be controlling); Diviney,
supra note 112, at 624-25 (an author's right of first publication should carry less weight in fair use
analysis when his or her manuscript is available in a library). As in Salinger, however, contractual
limitations on access should be relevant. In Salinger, the court explained that "Salinger's letters are
unpublished, and they have not lost that attribute by their placement in libraries where access has
been explicitly made subject to observance of at least the protections of copyright law." 811 F.2d at
97.
201. Both contractual and legal rights will be relevant. Confidentiality was a contractual right in
Harper & Row. 471 U.S. at 546. Confidentiality also may limit fair use of private letters, according
to the well-developed fair use doctrine governing letters. That doctrine dictates that copyright in a
letter remains with its writer, while an absolute right to destroy, preserve, or even display that letter
belongs to its recipient, subject to limitations imposed by confidentiality. I NIMMER ON COPY-
RIGHT, supra note 38, § 5.04 at 5-32.16 to 5-32.17.
202. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564 ("The right of first publication encompasses not only
the choice whether to publish at all, but also the choices of when, where, and in what form first to
publish a work."); Salinger, 811 F.2d at 99. See also supra notes 62, 163, 165, 196 and accompany-
ing text.
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establish and communicate factual information.2 °3 Second, texts such as
letters or memoranda may deserve less protection because they are not
works in progress over which their authors still seek to retain artistic or
conceptual control.2°  Third, courts called upon to protect literary prop-
erty in the letters of celebrated writers such as J.D. Salinger should tailor
their holdings narrowly. 2 5 Broad holdings might impede access to un-
published texts better described as historical documents than as literary
properties, texts written by ordinary people and deposited in research
collections for the use of scholars. 2
The same policy concerns, authorial property and privacy, and cul-
tural productivity, that stand behind the second statutory fair use factor
also stand behind the third and fourth: the "amount and substantiality"
of the text taken and "the effect of the use upon the potential market" for
the quoted work.20 7 When the source quoted is unpublished, however,
the court must analyze the second and third factors together. According
to Harper & Row, the amount that may be quoted under the fair use
privilege varies with the published or unpublished nature of the
source.2" 8 If it is published, Harper & Row allows "substantial quota-
tions,",2°  but if it is unpublished, the Court held that only "briefer
quotes" may be permissible when "arguably necessary adequately to con-
vey the facts."210
Policy questions are no less relevant to the fourth statutory factor,
"the effect of the use upon the potential market." '211 According to
Harper & Row, it is the most important fair use factor.212 It is also,
however, the most conjectural. In analyzing it, courts currently ask
whether an infringing work displaces or materially impairs the infringed
work's potential market.21 3 Under any circumstances, defining potential
203. 471 U.S. at 563.
204. See Zissu, supra note 200, at 15.
205. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 96 (on Salinger's correspondence as literature), 99 (reporting the esti-
mated current value of Salinger's unpublished letters at $500,000).
206. Cf. Statement of T. Branch, supra note 161, at 6.
207. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(3)-(4) (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). See also supra note 3.
208. 471 U.S. at 564-63.
209. Id. at 564.
210. Id. at 563.
211, 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(4) (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). See also supra note 3.
212. 471 U.S. at 566.
213. Applying the functional fair use test, the Supreme Court in Harper & Row defined fair use
as "copying... which does not materially impair the marketability of the work which is copied."
471 U.S. at 566-67 (quoting I NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 38, § 1.10[D], at 1-87). The
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market is a difficult task,214 but defining the potential market for an un-
published work is harder still, as Salinger demonstrates.
In Salinger, the court found that a biographer's quotations from Salin-
ger's letters "would not displace the market for the letters."2 ' Neverthe-
less, the court held that "some impairment of the market seems
likely." '216 The court explained: "some appreciable number of persons"
might suppose that the paraphrases were Salinger's actual words and so
be less interested in purchasing the originals.2 17  Such a weak argu-
ment218 in an otherwise cogent opinion lends weight to contentions that
courts should drop the material impairment test for market effect.219
Even if courts retain that test, it will be to the advantage of courts and
litigants alike to reduce the conjectural character of market-effect
analysis.
Harper & Row affords an easy but narrow route out of the impasse, as
it concerned the quotation of a small but critical passage from Gerald
Ford's memoirs that effectively destroyed the value of a book's prepubli-
cation serialization.220 When a case lacks such evidence of actual market
destruction, Harper & Row suggests another strategy: conjoining mar-
ket-effect analysis with analysis of the third statutory fair use factor, the
"amount and substantiality of the portion used. 221 In Harper & Row,
the Court held that taking the critical "heart" of a work, even if it
amounted only to several hundred words, can damage a work's
market.
2 2 2
Court also embraced Wendy Gordon's fair-use-as-market-failure theory. Id. at 566 n.9 (citing with
approval Gordon, supra note 5, at 1615).
214. See Fisher, supra note 2, at 1669-72.
215. 811 F.2d at 99.
216. Id. The court reached this conclusion, although Salinger disavowed an intent to publish,
on the ground that an author is free to change his or her mind about publishing. Id.
217. Id.
218. Devotees of literary correspondence are a small group unlikely to settle for anything less
than reliable editions of the original texts they cherish. General readers, on the contrary, are un-
likely to buy such publications at all. On these grounds alone, it might be argued that Salinger's
biography enhanced the potential market for the novelist's letters by bringing those documents to the
attention of aficionados. But cf. Roger L. Zissu, Salinger and Random House Part 11. Fears, Criti-
cisms of Opinion Result from Misreading of Decision, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 189, 194 (1988) (de-
fending Salinger's market-effect analysis by observing that the Second Circuit en bane and the
Supreme Court chose not to review the decision).
219. See Fisher, supra note 2, at 1672.
220. 471 U.S. at 564-65, 567.
221. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(3) (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). See supra note 3.
222. 471 U.S. at 565. According to the Court, the "heart" of Ford's memoirs concerned the
Nixon pardon. Id. at 568.
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Analogously, in Salinger, the Second Circuit found that paraphrased
portions of Salinger's letters, introduced by such expressions as "he
wrote," could "convey the impression that [readers] have read Salinger's
words, perhaps not quoted verbatim, but paraphrased so closely as to
diminish interest in purchasing the originals. ' 22 3 One may quarrel with
that conclusion,224 yet adopt the analysis that led to it: deducing prob-
able market effect from such textual evidence as the amount taken and
the manner in which it is presented to the public.
CONCLUSION
The fair use of unpublished works is a new problem for copyright law.
It dates to 1976, when the federal copyright statute extended statutory
copyright protection to unpublished works and exposed them, for the
first time, to the fair use privilege. Interpreting the statute's fair use pro-
vision and applying it to unpublished works is a troublesome task for the
courts, and the Second Circuit now has come close to holding that quota-
tions from unpublished works are per se illegal.
It is by no means certain that Congress will rescue the courts from the
impasse to which they are heading. But the Second Circuit's fair use
decisions and the controversies surrounding them reveal that the judici-
ary may be willing and able to withdraw from that impasse by its own
efforts. Hence the arguments advanced here: 1) statute and case law do
not preclude the fair use of unpublished sources; 2) the judiciary is pre-
pared to affirm that privilege; 3) doing so will require that the Second
Circuit relax its restrictive Salinger rule;225 and 4) fair use analysis
should build on the policies that historically have informed copyright law
and the fair use privilege.
Since fair use requires the "balancing of equities" and resists the fram-
ing of rules, 226 the focus here has been on the questions a court should
ask and the factors a court should weigh, not the rules and holdings a
court may frame. Those must depend on cases yet to be argued.
Harold A. Ellis*
223. 811 F.2d at 99.
224. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
225. 811 F.2d at 97.
226. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
* The author gratefully acknowledges the comments and criticisms of Jessica Goldman and
Charles McManis, who read earlier drafts of this Note.
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